

**POLISCI 312 | INTLPOL 211 | REES 219**

**A New Cold War?  
Great Power Relations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

**Term:** Spring 2025

**Units:** 5 units

**Instructor:** Michael McFaul, [mcfaul@stanford.edu](mailto:mcfaul@stanford.edu)

**Room:** Encina Hall, 616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

**Time:** Tuesdays 1:30-4:20 pm.

**Course Description**

When the Cold War ended in 1991, it was a glorious moment to be a multilateralist and liberal democrat. The Soviet Union disintegrated, and it seemed like the whole world wanted to become a democracy and join the democratic community of states. Today, great power competition is back, with many analysts describing our current era as a “New Cold War” between the United States, China, and Russia. How did we go from euphoria surrounding democracy, globalization, and the West three decades ago to current uncertainty about democracy and the liberal international order and fear about the rise of illiberal great powers? Is the Cold War label an illuminating or distorting analogy, and how stable or enduring is this current moment of global confrontation? The course seeks to answer these questions and analyze contemporary great power relations more broadly.

We will begin by reviewing major theories that explain relations between great powers. The second part of the course traces the historical origins of the U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China relations, examining the interplay between three central drivers of international relations—power, regime types, and leaders—over time. In the third part of the course, we will assess the similarities and differences between the Cold War and U.S.-Russia relations and U.S.-China relations today along three dimensions in the international system: (1) power, (2) ideology, and (3) competing conceptions of global order. The fourth and final part of the course will discuss a set of concrete policy recommendations for how U.S. leaders can meet the challenge of great power competition in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The main text for this course will be the draft of my new book, titled *Democrats versus Autocrats: China, Russia, America, and the New World Disorder*, as well as accompanying academic books and articles.

**Office Hours:**

Thursday afternoons and by appointment only.

Please schedule with Mahlorei Bruce Apalis, [mahlorei@stanford.edu](mailto:mahlorei@stanford.edu)

**Assignments**

Students are expected to attend every class and complete all required readings before each session, which we will use to stimulate discussion. Because this course is a seminar, sessions will be highly participatory. You must come prepared to participate actively in all sessions. **At a minimum, in order to receive full participation points, you should be prepared to make at least one substantive comment or ask one substantive question per session.**

Students with an excused absence must notify the course assistant in writing before the start of class.

From weeks five to eight, students will start off the discussion by presenting their short papers (3-5 pages). You need to define key terms (e.g., power and ideology) and reference the political theory we studied in class. Short papers must be completed and uploaded on Canvas **on Sunday at 11:59 pm before the seminar**, during which you are scheduled to present. We will assign paper topics during the second session of the course.

For the final paper, you have two options: (1) a theoretical essay explaining great power competition or (2) a research paper on one aspect of great power competition. Your paper must reference the political theory we studied in class and be up to 15 pages in length, double-spaced. The deadline for the final paper is June 8, 2025, at 11:59 pm.

## **Evaluation**

30%: class participation

20%: presentation and midterm paper (topic assignments [here](#))

50%: final paper

## **Academic Accommodations**

Students who need academic accommodation based on the impact of a disability must initiate the request with the Office of Accessible Education (OAE). Professional staff will evaluate the request with the required documentation, recommend reasonable accommodations, and prepare an Accommodation Letter for faculty. Unless the student has a temporary disability, Accommodation Letters are issued for the entire academic year. Students should contact the OAE as soon as possible since timely notice is needed to coordinate accommodations. The OAE is located at 563 Salvatierra Walk (phone: 650-723-1066, <https://oae.stanford.edu/>).

## **Course Materials**

Drafts of book chapters and select readings will be posted on Canvas. You can access academic articles as well as articles from major media with your Stanford login. See [here](#) and [here](#).

# **COURSE SCHEDULE**

## Week 1: Introduction

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Date: Tuesday, April 1, 2025

### Required:

Chapter 1 – Introduction: A New Cold War?

### Recommended:

Christensen, Thomas J. “There Will Not Be a New Cold War: The Limits of U.S.-Chinese Competition,” *Foreign Affairs*. March 24, 2021.

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-03-24/there-will-not-be-new-cold-war>

Ferguson, Niall. “The New Cold War? It’s With China, and It Has Already Begun.” *The New York Times*. December 2, 2019.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/02/opinion/china-cold-war.html>

FU Ying [傅莹]. Cooperative competition is possible between China and the U.S. *The New York Times*. November 24, 2020. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/24/opinion/china-us-biden.html>

McMaster, Lt. General H.R. (U.S. Army, Retired), Testimony Before the U.S. House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party Tuesday, February 28, 2023.

<https://www.congress.gov/118/meeting/house/115402/witnesses/HHRG-118-ZS00-Wstate-McMasterH-20230228.pdf>

Yang Jiemian [杨洁勉]. The ideological origins and theoretical basis of the United States’ perception of China as a “major threat.” [美国视中国为《主要威胁》的思想溯源和理论依]. *International Outlook*, 1(1). January 2023. In [English](#) via Sinification Substack, in [Mandarin](#).

Karabell, Zachary. “There’s No Cold War with China.” *Foreign Policy*. August 14, 2020.

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/14/cold-war-china-misuse-of-history-united-states-soviet-union/>.

Kim, Patricia, M., Turpin, Matthew, Nye, Joseph, S., Chen Weiss, Jessica, Eun, A Jo, Hass, Ryan & Kimball, Emilie. “Should the US pursue a new Cold War with China?” *Brookings Institute*. September 1, 2023.

<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/should-the-us-pursue-a-new-cold-war-with-china/>

Polyakova, Alina. “Are U.S. and Russia in a new Cold War?” *Brookings Institute*, January 20, 2019. <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/are-u-s-and-russia-in-a-new-cold-war/>.

ZHANG Weiwei [张维为]. “Creating Chaos and Turmoil, the Myth of American Democracy is Shattered—The United States Incites 'Color Revolutions' and Endangers World Peace and

Stability” [制造混乱动荡，美式民主神话破灭—美国煽动“颜色革命”危害世界和平稳定]. *People's Daily* [人民日报]. September 20, 2022. In [English](#). In [Mandarin](#).

Charles L. Glaser, “Fear Factor: How to Know When You’re in a Security Dilemma,” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2024): 122-27.

## Week 2: Realism

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Date: Tuesday, April 8, 2025

### Required:

Mearsheimer, John. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton & Company, 2014.

- Chapter 1: Introduction
- Chapter 2: Anarchy and the Struggle for Power

Holsti, Ole R. “Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy, G. John Ikenberry and Peter L. Trubowitz, editors, *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 13-34. Mearsheimer, John. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton & Company, 2014.

Waltz, Kenneth. “Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power,” in *American Foreign Policy*, pp. 55-72.

Snyder, Jack. “One World, Rival Theories,” *Foreign Policy*, 2009;  
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/26/one-world-rival-theories/>

Goldgeier, James, and Michael McFaul, “A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era.” *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 467-491.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027788>

### Recommended:

Nau, Henry R. *Perspectives on International Relations. Power, Institutions, and Ideas*. Sixth Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2019.  
[https://ocd.lcwu.edu.pk/cfiles/Political%20Science/EC/Pol.Sc-501/Henry\\_R.\\_Nau\\_Perspectives\\_on\\_International\\_Relatz-lib2.org1.pdf](https://ocd.lcwu.edu.pk/cfiles/Political%20Science/EC/Pol.Sc-501/Henry_R._Nau_Perspectives_on_International_Relatz-lib2.org1.pdf)

- Chapter 5: How to think about International Relations. Perspectives, Levels of Analysis, and Causal Arrows.”

Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, (1978) pp. 167-214.  
[https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/wpot30&div=13&g\\_sent=1&casa\\_token=&collection=journals](https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/wpot30&div=13&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals)

Schweller, Randall L., and William C. Wohlforth. "Power Test: Evaluating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War" *Security Studies* Vol. 9, No. 3 (2000), pp. 60–107.  
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636410008429406>

Harrison, Wagner. *War and the State* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007).  
<https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.224944>

Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations*. (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2005).

## **Week 3: Liberalism (and a little Marxism & Constructivism)**

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Date: Tuesday, April 15, 2025

### **Required:**

Ikenberry, John. *A World Safe for Democracy*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020),  
<https://www-degruyter-com.stanford.idm.oclc.org/document/doi/10.12987/9780300256093/html>

- Chapter 1: Cracks in the Liberal World Order
- Chapter 2: Liberal Democracy and International Relations
- Chapter 8: The Crisis of the Post-Cold War Liberal Order

Hyde, Susan, and Saunders, Elizabeth. "Recapturing Regime Type in International Relations: Leaders, Institutions, and Agency Space." *International Organization*, Vol. 74, No. 2 (2020), pp. 363-395.  
<https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/E1CD35C02F0A247A67D9E7BE361A5FC7/S0020818319000365a.pdf/div-class-title-recapturing-regime-type-in-international-relations-leaders-institutions-and-agency-space-div.pdf>

Owen, John M. "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace." *International Security* Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539197?origin=crossref>

Pal, Maia. "Introducing Marxism in International Relations Theory." *E-International Relations* (February 2018), <https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/72866>

Moravcsik, Andrew. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (1997).  
[https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/04527E00D02130C6DCCB57A98EFB6AD3/S0020818397440171a.pdf/taking\\_preferences\\_seriously\\_a\\_liberal\\_theory\\_of\\_international\\_politics.pdf](https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/04527E00D02130C6DCCB57A98EFB6AD3/S0020818397440171a.pdf/taking_preferences_seriously_a_liberal_theory_of_international_politics.pdf)

Gartzke, Erik, and Jiakung Jack Zhang. "Trade and War." In *Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade*, ed. Lisa L. Martin. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015) <https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/34472/chapter/292501066>

Farrell, Henry, and Abraham L. Newman. 2019. "Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion" *International Security* 44 (1): 42-79. <https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/44/1/42/12237/Weaponized-Interdependence-How-Global-Economic>

### **Recommended:**

Finnemore M, Wendt A. When "Old" Constructivism Was New: Reflections on Classical Constructivism. *Perspectives on Politics*. 2024;22(4):1248-1268. doi:10.1017/S1537592724001464. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/when-old-constructivism-was-new-reflections-on-classical-constructivism/C0A9B4D33AD576B4CDBFE6BC71F1D2EB>

Haas, Marc. "Ideological Polarity and Balancing Great Power Politics, *Security Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (October 2014), pp. 715-53.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1974), pp. 387-415. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/178015.pdf>

Keohane, Robert, and Joseph S. Nye Jr. *Power and Interdependence* (New York: Pearson, 2011).

Nye, Joseph S. "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy*, no. 80: 153–71, 1990. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1148580>

Lenin, Vladimir, *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916). <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/>

Gartzke, Erik. "The Capitalist Peace." *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1): 166-91, 2007. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4122913>

Voeten, Erik. *Ideology and International Institutions*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021), pp. 17-28. <https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9780691207339/html>

Allison, Graham. "The Myth of the Liberal Order" *Foreign Affairs*, June 14, 2018. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/myth-liberal-order>

Barbieri, Katherine, and Jack S. Levy. 1999. "Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of War on Trade." *Journal of Peace Research* 36(4): 463-479. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/425299>

Davis, Christina L., and Tyler Pratt. "The Forces of Attraction: How Security Interests Shape Membership in Economic Institutions." *Review of International Organizations*, 2020. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11558-020-09395-w>

Lascurettes, Kyle. *Orders of Exclusion*. Oxford University Press, 2020. <https://academic.oup.com/book/36872?login=true>

Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. "The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992." *World Politics* 52(1): 1-37. [669], 1999. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25054099>

Post, Paul, and Johannes Urpelainen, "How International Organizations Support Democratization: Preventing Authoritarian Reversals or Promoting Consolidation?" *World Politics*. (January 2015): 72-113 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24578339>

## **Week 4: Leaders, Bureaucratic Politics, and Culture**

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Date: Tuesday, April 22, 2025

### **Required:**

Allison, Graham T. "Conceptual Models of the Cuban Missile Crisis." *American Political Science Review* 63, no. 3 (September 1969): 689-718. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1954423?origin=crossref>

Saunders, Elizabeth N. "Transformative Choices Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy." *International Security* 34, no. 2, Fall 2009: 119-161. <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2009.34.2.119>

McFaul, Michael. "Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy." *International Security* 45, no. 2 (Fall 2020): 95-123. <https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/45/2/95/95260/Putin-Putinism-and-the-Domestic-Determinants-of>

Huntington, Samuel P. "Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations>.

Kelebogile Zvobgo and Meredith Loken, "Why Race Matters in International Relations," *Foreign Policy*, July 1, 2020. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/19/why-race-matters-international-relations-ir/>

## Recommended:

Hermann, Margaret, and Hermann, Charles. "Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry." *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 4 (December 1989): 361-387. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2600518>

Jervis, Robert. "Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?" *Security Studies* 22, no. 2 (April 2013): 153-179. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2013.786909>

Tomz, Michael, and Jessica L.P. Weeks. "Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 4 (November 2013): 849-865. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000488>.

Weeks, Jessica L. "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 106, no. 2 (May 2012): 326-347. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000111>

Drezner, Daniel. "Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics and the Crafting of Foreign Policy." *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 4 (October 2000): 733-749. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2669278>

Schultz, Kenneth. "Domestic Politics and International Relations." In *Handbook of International Relations*, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, 478-502. London: Sage Publications, 2013. <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/stanford-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1046504>

## China

Economy, Elizabeth C. "Introduction" and "The Lion Awakens." In *The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State*, 1-19 and 186-230. Oxford University Press, 2018.

Jakobson, Linda, and Ryan Manuel. "How are Foreign Policy Decisions Made in China?" *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies* 3, no.1 (January 2016): 101-110. <https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.121>.

Lampton, David M. "China's Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Process: Is It Changing, and Does It Matter?" In *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform*, 1-36. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Miller, Alice. "Valedictory: Analyzing the Chinese Leadership In An Era Of Sex, Money, and Power." *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 57 (Fall 2018), 1-17. <https://www.hoover.org/research/valedictory-analyzing-chinese-leadership-era-sex-money-and-power>

Ye, Min. "Fragmentation and Mobilization: Domestic Politics of the Belt and Road in China." *Journal of Contemporary China* (February 2019): 1-16.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1580428>

### *Russia*

Gurganus, Julia, and Eugene Rumer. "Russia's Global Ambitions in Perspective." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, February 20, 2019.  
<https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/20/russia-s-global-ambitions-in-perspective-pub-78067>.

Lavrov, Sergey. "Russia's Foreign Policy in a Historical Perspective." *Russia in Global Affairs*, March 2016.  
<https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Russias-Foreign-Policy-in-a-Historical-Perspective-18067>.

Taylor, Brian D. "Introduction" and "Putinism Decoded." In *The Code of Putinism*, Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 1-41.  
<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/stanford-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5400953>

## **Week 5: Causes of Past Great Power Conflict and Cooperation**

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Date: Tuesday, April 29, 2025

### **Required:**

Chapter 2. Cooperation and Conflict with Russia  
Chapter 3: Working With and Against China

Student Paper #1: Power Was the Central Driver of Past US-Russia Relations  
Student Paper #2: Power Was *Not* the Central Driver of Past US-Russia Relations  
Student Paper #3: Power Was the Central Driver of Past US-China Relations  
Student Paper #4: Power Was *Not* the Central Driver of Past US-China Relations

### **Recommended:**

Dahl, Robert, "The Concert of Power," *Behavioral Science*, vol. 2, no. 3, 1957.  
[https://fbaum.unc.edu/teaching/articles/Dahl\\_Power\\_1957.pdf](https://fbaum.unc.edu/teaching/articles/Dahl_Power_1957.pdf)

X (Kennan, George F.). "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." *Foreign Affairs*. July 1947.  
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct>

X. "The Longer Telegram: Toward a New American China Strategy." *Atlantic Council*. January 2021.  
<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-Longer-Telegram-Toward-A-New-American-China-Strategy.pdf>

Gaddis, John Lewis. *Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States: An Interpretive History (America & the World)*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1978.

Haas, Mark. *The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989*. Cornell University Press, 2005.

Kagan, Robert. *Dangerous Nation: American's Foreign Policy from Its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the Twentieth Century*. Knopf, 2006.

Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and the Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. Random House, 1987.

Pomfret, John. *The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom: America and China, 1776 to the Present*. Henry Holt and Co., 2016.

Shell, Orville. "The Death of Engagement." *The Wire China*. June 7, 2020.  
<https://www.thewirechina.com/2020/06/07/the-birth-life-and-death-of-engagement/>

## **Week 6: Hard Power**

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Date: Tuesday, May 6, 2025

### **Required:**

Chapter 4: The End of American Hegemony

Chapter 5: The Balance of Power between the U.S. and Russia Today

Chapter 6: The Balance of Power between the U.S. and China Today

Student Paper #5: Russia Is a Great Power

Student Paper #6: Russia Is a *Not* Great Power

Student Paper #7: China Is a Great Power

Student Paper #8: China Is an *OVERRATED* Power

Student Paper #9: U.S. Is a Declining Power

Student Paper #10: U.S. Is a Rising Power

### **Recommended:**

Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, "Underestimating China: Why America Needs a New Strategy of Allied Scale to Offset Beijing's Enduring Advantages," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2025. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/underestimating-china>

Sullivan, Jake. "The Sources of American Power." *Foreign Affairs*. November/December 2023.  
<https://www-foreignaffairs-com.stanford.idm.oclc.org/united-states/sources-american-power-bid-en-jake-sullivan>

Allison, Graham. "China vs. America: Managing the Next Clash of Civilizations." *Foreign Affairs*. September/October 2017.

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-08-15/china-vs-america>.

Bacevich, Andrew. "The Reckoning that Wasn't: Why America Remains Trapped by False Dreams of Hegemony," *Foreign Affairs*, (March-April 2023), pp. 6-21.

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/andrew-bacevich-the-reckoning-that-wasnt-america-hegemony>

Chen Weiss, Jessica. "Don't Panic About Taiwan: Alarm Over a Chinese Invasion Could Become a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy," *Foreign Affairs*, March 21, 2023.

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/taiwan-chinese-invasion-dont-panic>.

Ivanov, Iskren, Russian military renaissance: an unnecessary war, *Qeios*, February 2023,

<https://www.qeios.com/read/RBQ36X>.

Mastro, Oriana. "The Stealthy Superpower," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2019: 31-39;

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/china-plan-rule-asia>

Mearsheimer, John. "Playing With Fire in Ukraine" *Foreign Affairs*, August 17, 2022;

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/playing-fire-ukraine>

McFaul, Michael, Stephen Sestanovich, and John Mearsheimer, "Faulty Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 93, No. 6 (November/ December 2014): pp. 167-178.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/24483933>

Wright, Thomas. 2018. "The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable," *The Atlantic*. September 12, 2018.

<https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-return-to-great-power-rivalry-was-inevitable/>

Allison, Graham. *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap?* Mariner Press, 2017.

Bartles, Charles, K. "Getting Gerasimov Right," *Military Review* (January-February 2016): 30-39.

[https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview\\_20160228\\_art001.pdf](https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art001.pdf)

Beckley, Michael. *Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World's Sole Superpower*. Cornell University Press, 2018.

<https://web.s.ebscohost.com/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook?sid=970b9444-b241-4859-89d0-d803e7b6034f%40redis&vid=0&format=EB>

Donilon, Tom. Remarks. National Security Advisor to the President: "The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013," *The White House*, March 11, 2013.

<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisor-president-united-states-an>

For Russian-language speakers: Герасимов, Валерий. «Ценность науки в предвидении», *Военно-промышленный курьер*, 2013.

[https://vpk.name/news/85159\\_cennost\\_nauki\\_v\\_predvidenii.html](https://vpk.name/news/85159_cennost_nauki_v_predvidenii.html)

Ikenberry, G. John and Daniel Nexon. 2019. “Hegemony Studies 3.0: The Dynamics of Hegemonic Orders” *Security Studies* 28(3): 395-421.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2019.1604981>

Kupchan, Cliff. (2021). Bipolarity is back: why it matters. *The Washington Quarterly*, 44(4). Pp.123-139. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020457>

Pieke, Frank. “The CPC’s Global Power”. In: Pieke, F. & Hofman, B. (Eds.) *CPC Futures: the New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics*. National University of Singapore Press: Singapore, pp. 86-94, 2022.

<https://openresearchlibrary.org/content/98785fc8-9111-44c2-87c7-06daeca190f2>

Stoner, Kathryn. *Russia Resurrected: Its Power and Purpose in a New Global Order*. Oxford University Press, 2021. <https://academic.oup.com/book/39757?login=true>

The White House, *National Security Strategy*, (Biden Administration), October 2022;

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>

The White House. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. (Trump Administration) December 2017.

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf>.

Wolforth, William. “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” *International Security*, (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539346>

Zelenskyy, Volodymyr. Address to the U.S. Congress. December 22, 2022. *YouTube*.

<https://youtu.be/7gjwICe5T6M>

## **Week 7: Ideational Power**

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Date: Tuesday, May 13, 2025

### **Required:**

Chapter 7: The Waning of Democracy as a Universal Value

Chapter 8: Global Putinism

Chapter 9: Exporting Xi Jinping Thought

Student Paper #11: Russia Is an Ideological Power

Student Paper #12: Russia Is Not an Ideological Power  
Student Paper #13: China Is an Ideological Power  
Student Paper #14: China Is Not an Ideological Power  
Student Paper #15: The U.S. Is an Ideological Power  
Student Paper #16: The U.S. Is Not an Ideological Power

**Recommended:**

Communiqué on the current state of the ideological sphere. (“Document No. 9”). *Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s General Office*. April 22, 2013. In [English](#). In [Mandarin](#) (scroll down).

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<https://meduza.io/en/feature/2023/03/17/russia-s-guardian-of-traditional-values>

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Putin, Vladimir. “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy.” *President of Russia*. February 10, 2007.

<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>.

Rudd, Kevin. “The World According to Xi Jinping,” *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2022).

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/world-according-xi-jinping-china-ideologue-kevin-rudd>

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## Week 8: Institutional Power

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Date: Tuesday, May 20, 2025

### Required:

Chapter 10: The Decline of the Liberal International Order

Chapter 11: Russian Global (Dis)Order

Chapter 12: China and Global Order

Student Paper #17: Russia Seeks to Undermine the Liberal International Order

Student Paper #18: Russia Does Not Seek to Undermine the Liberal International Order

Student Paper #19: China Seeks to Undermine the Liberal International Order

Student Paper #20: China Does Not Seek to Undermine the Liberal International Order

Student Paper #21: The U.S. Seeks to Preserve the Liberal International Order

Student Paper #22: The U.S. Seeks to Withdraw from the Liberal International Order

### Recommended:

Johnston, Alastair Iain. "China in a World of Orders: Rethinking Compliance and Challenge in Beijing's International Relations." *International Security* 44, no. 2 (2019): 9-60.

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<https://ia601806.us.archive.org/12/items/america-against-america/America%20Against%20America.pdf>

## **Week 9: The Future: Cold War Lessons and Policy Prescriptions**

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Date: Tuesday, May 27, 2025

### **Required:**

Chapter 13: Learning from Cold War Mistakes

Chapter 14: Replicating Cold War Successes

Chapter 15: New Challenges Need New Policies

Chapter 16: Conclusion

### **Discussion Questions:**

1. What are the similarities and differences between the Cold War and our current era of great power competition?
2. Are there lessons from the Cold War for our current era of great power competition?
3. Does Trump change everything?

### **Recommended:**

Ashford, Emma M., Hal Brands, Jason J. Castilo, Kate Kizer, Rebecca Friedman Lissner, and Joshua Shiffrin. "New Voices in Grand Strategy" Michael J. Zak Grand Strategy Lectures. Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2019.

<https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/new-voices-in-grand-strategy>

Hurlburt, Heather. “More Diplomacy, Less Intervention, but for What? Making Sense of the Grand Strategy Debate” *Lawfare*, June 7, 2019.  
<https://www.lawfareblog.com/more-diplomacy-less-intervention-what-making-sense-grand-strategy-debate>

Musgrave, Paul. “International Hegemony Meets Domestic Politics: Why Liberals Can be Pessimists.” *Security Studies* 28(3): 451-478, 2019.  
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Swaine, Michael, D. & Bachevich, Andrew. “A restraint approach to U.S.-China relations: reversing the slide towards crisis and conflict.” Quincy Paper No.11. *Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft*. April 18, 2023.  
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<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/samantha-power-how-democracy-can-win-counter-autocracy>.

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<https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/identifying-russian-vulnerabilities-and-how-to-leverage-them>

Xi Jinping. Speech at APEC Summit 2023. Tuesday, 15 November 2023. In [Mandarin with English subtitles](#).

## **Week 10: Dinner Discussion at McFaul’s House**

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Date: Tuesday, June 3, 2025